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THE COMPETING DOCTRINES OF PRIVACY
AND FREE SPEECH TAKE CENTER STAGE
AFTER PRINCESS DIANA'S DEATH
There has been no international icon in the world to
match Diana, Princess of Wales. No public figure in
history has been the subject of more unremitting
attention on the part of the paparazzi. The fact that
she met her death while apparently seeking to escape
a pursuit by photographers carries its own cruel
irony. 1
Shortly after Princess Diana's death, some members of the
public felt that "she was killed fleeing the flashbulbs she often
positioned herself to attract." 2 The pertinent question then became,
and has traditionally been, 3 whether or not privacy is a value that calls
for protection?4 If so, from where did the right to privacy derive?
What exact sphere of privacy is protected? Who may assert this right
and to what degree?
This note will focus on the inherent tension between the
competing doctrines of the right to privacy and the right to free speech
and press.5 These opposing views were notably evoked in Princess
Diana's recent death and the alleged complicity of the paparazzi. 6
Part I will present a history of the recognition by courts and state
' Diana Frances Spencer 1961-1997, DOmNION (WELLINGTON), Sept. 9,
1997 at 4.
2 See Geoffrey Robertson, Privacy Matters, NEW YORKER, Sept. 15, 1997, at
38 (discussing a lawsuit brought by Princess Diana against a gym she regularly attended
for installing a hidden camera in the ceiling and secretly taking photographs of her as she
exercised; Princess Diana asked the court to do something that had no precedent in
Britain: to protect her privacy).
3 See Anthony Lewis, Diana and the Media: Open Verdict, GUARDIAN
(LONDON), Sept. 8, 1997, at 8 (discussing the origins of the law of privacy).4 1d.
5 See generally Di Mari Ricker, The Wild, Wild Press, STUDENT LAWYER,
Feb. 1998, at 25 (discussing England's struggle after Princess Diana's death to balance
freedom of the press with celebrities' right to privacy).
6 Id. (quoting Princess Diana's brother who charged that each publication
who had paid for intrusive pictures of his sister was culpable for her death).
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legislatures of the right to privacy. 7 Part 1I will consider the history
and development of the free speech and press clause of the First
Amendment. Specifically, it will examine the conduct of journalists
in gathering information about or photographing of public figures and
to what degree that behavior has been afforded immunity by the
courts under the authority of United States Constitution. Part III will
develop an inquiry into how the right to privacy increases or decreases
when applied to individuals who occupy different statuses in society,
such as celebrities. In particular, it will examine another right derived
from the right to privacy which public figures alone enjoy, called the
right of publicity. Finally, Part V sets forth a solution to the
problematic issues which stem from these competing constitutional
rights, namely the promotion and maintenance of media self-restraint
without the expansion of privacy laws or the increase of legal
restrictions on the paparazzi. It will discuss the potential danger new
privacy laws may pose by shielding politicians and others from
legitimate press examination and the difficulty these new laws will
inevitably face in passing constitutional analysis.
I. RIGHT To PRIVACY
The law of privacy in America was first inspired by an 1890
Harvard Law Review article written by future Supreme Court Justice
Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren.8 These two Boston
attorneys were responding to a form of tabloid journalism that was
just beginning to develop called "yellow journalism,"9 and to new
technologies'" which made it possible to easily and rapidly collect and
disseminate information." Brandeis and Warren said "gossip is no
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 B (1977) (incorporating causes of
action for torts such as invasion of privacy, libel and emotional distress); ALI MODEL
PENAL CODE § 221.2 (protecting against criminal trespass).
8 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890)
(speaking of an individual's "right to be let alone").
9 See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, CELEBRITIES AND PRIVACY 5 (1985).
1o Id. (referring to cameras, telephones, telegraphs and speed printing
presses).
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longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery ....
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life .... ,12 The phrase "the
right to be let alone"' 13 originated in the Warren-Brandeis 1890 article
stands for the earliest recognition of a liberty until then unknown: the
right to privacy. 14  Thereafter, state legislatures enacted laws that
created a remedy for a person whose name or image was exploited
commercially without consent." Today most states have privacy laws
of one kind or another.16
A century has passed and it is still difficult to decipher exactly
what privacy laws protect and whether they truly guard an
individual's right to be let alone. 17 Unfortunately, it seems as though
not much has changed since the old and sad tale of William James
Sidis. is Sidis, a turn of the century child prodigy, attempted to lead an
anonymous life but was unwillingly thrust into the public eye through
an intrusive article published by the New Yorker.19 Sidis sued for
invasion of privacy. 20 The court called the piece merciless but
rejected Sidis' claim, stating that "the misfortunes and frailties of
neighbours and public figures are subjects of considerable interest and
discussion to the rest of the population. When such are the mores of
2 See id.
13 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 193.
4 See generally Smith, supra note 9.
15 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 990 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (West
1998); VA. CODE § 8.0140 (1992).
16 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that the Warren-Brandeis idea was
adopted by many American courts, in addition to a number of states which passed
legislative statutes).
17 See id.
18See, e.g., Sidis v. F.R. Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1940)
(concerning a publisher who used a cartoon of former child celebrity and mathematical
prodigy Sidis, to promote a "Where Are They Now?" article).
'9 See id. (the article revealed that despite lecturing at Harvard at age eleven
on Four-Dimensional bodies in mathematics, Sidis was currently residing in "a hall
bedroom of Boston's shabby south end," working as an insignificant clerk, and collecting
streetcar transfers).
"0 See id.
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the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their expression
in the newspapers, books and magazines of the day." 2
1
Shortly thereafter, another unsuccessful attempt to vindicate a
privacy violation was made by Abigail Marie Roberson who relied in
part on the Warren-Brandeis article to sue a flour company for using
her picture, without consent, in an advertisement. 22 Finding that the
"right to be let alone" thesis lacked support in case law, the court
rejected Roberson's claim. 23
The Roberson decision generated much criticism, 24 prompting
Legislatures to enact right to privacy statutes.25 The first statutory
right to privacy was codified as § 50 and 51 of the New York Civil
Rights Law.26 Section 50 prohibits the use of a living person's name,
portrait or picture for "advertising" or "trade" purposes without prior
written consent. 27 The right to privacy in the state of New York, is
governed exclusively by this law.28 An exception to § 50 of the New
York Civil Rights Law has been carved out by the judiciary, which
has consistently held that the statute should not be construed to apply
to newsworthy events or matters of public interest.29 The
newsworthiness exception applies not only to political happenings but
also to a myriad of public interest stories including articles about
social and economic trends.30 Thus, at least in the state of New York,
the right to privacy is not all encompassing.
21 Id. at 809.
22 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
23 Id. at 538.
24 Arrington v. New York Times Company, 434 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1982)
(stating that concern generated by this decision prompted the Legislature to enact new
laws).
25 N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1998); CAL. CIV. CODE §
990 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (West 1998); VA. CODE § 8.01-40 (1992).26 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1998).
27 Id.
28 See Howell v. New York Post Company, Inc., 81 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993)
(stating that in New York state a claim for a privacy right intrusion must fall within §§ 50
and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law).29 Id. at 703.
30 Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984)
(rejecting a model's right to privacy claim that defendant used a photograph of plaintiff
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Support for the right to privacy doctrine, however, was
reinvigorated in 1960 through Dean Prosser's seminal law review
article in which he identified four categories of privacy intrusions, one
of which came to be known as the "right to publicity.",31 This fourth
category, which prohibits the nonconsensual use of a person's name
or image for profit or commercial advantage, is a class of privacy
rights violations frequently recognized by modem day courts.3
2
Furthermore, this prohibition involves a critical distinction from the
other three types of invasions in that the misappropriation of a
person's name or image can involve not only "the right to be let
alone" but also the right to be compensated.33 This is often the case
when a celebrity's personality is misappropriated.34 Part III will
present the history and evolution of the right to publicity and will
examine the use of this right by public figures.
Over time, the three remaining categories Prosser articulated
in his 1960 article were codified in the Restatement [Second] of
Torts.35 Public disclosure of private facts,36 unreasonable intrusion
upon seclusion or solitude,37 and publicity that unreasonably places
modeling a winter jacket for advertising purposes without consent and finding that the
publication of the plaintiff's photograph falls within the newsworthiness exception).
31 See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. Rnv. 383 (1960) (articulating the different
aspects of privacy by setting forth four categories: 1) intrusion upon a person's solitude or
seclusion, 2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, 3) publicity that places the
individual in a false light in the eyes of the public, and, often called the right to publicity
4) the use of a person's name or image by someone else for profit or commercial
advantage).
32 See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821
(9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the use of a professional race car driver's photograph
without his consent violated his right to publicity); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendant's non-consensual use of a Bette Midler
sound-alike to sing one of Midler's famous songs constituted a violation of the celebrity's
publicity rights).
33 See Katherine L. Blanck, Restricting The Use of "Sound-Alikes " in
Commercial Speech by Amending the Right of Publicity Statute in California, 26 SAN
DIEoo L. REv. 911, 919 (1989) (discussing the evolution of the right of publicity).
'Id. at 919.35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. §§ 652A-652E (1987).
3 Id. at app. § 652D (Publicity Given to Private Life).37 Id. at app. § 652B (Intrusion Upon Seclusion).
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another in a false light38 are privacy invasion torts that have been
recognized by the courts. 39  The Restatement of Torts, 40 and a
majority of states41 have come to recognize as tortious as an intrusion
"physically or otherwise upon the solitude, or seclusion of another, or
his private affairs or concerns ... if accomplished ... in a manner that
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person".42  The
Restatement, coupled with existing laws of general applicability,43
provide for injunctive and, where appropriate, monetary relief against
the misconduct of press members."
Almost a century after the Brandeis-Warren introduction of
the right to privacy, the courts began applying this right to other
aspects of life such as marital and familial relationships. The
Supreme Court has recognized the right to privacy from government
interference with regard to, inter alia, contraception,45 abortion,46 and
the right to refuse medical treatment.47 In these instances, the Court
has interpreted certain amendments4 to the Constitution as implying
38 Id. at app. § 652E (Publicity Placing Person in False Light).39 See, e.g., Sidis, 113 F.2d at 808; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 443 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (allowing plaintiff to recover for press' broadcast of
plaintiff's entertainment act); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982)
(discussing plaintiffs claim for libel, "false light" invasion of privacy (to recover for
injured feelings), and "outrageous conduct").40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. §§ 652A-652E (1987).
41 See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding that torts
committed in the newsgathering are not protected under the First Amendment).
42 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS app. §§ 652A-652E (1987).
43 See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1277 (4th Cir. 1986) (allowing public
figures to recover damages under intentional infliction of emotional distress tort theory);
see also Galella, 487 F.2d at 991 (finding Galella guilty of harassment).
4See Jeffrey Fiegelson & James C. Goodale, Greater Legal Restrictions on
the Paparazzi? No, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at 2 (stating that U.S. law provides for
injunctive relief against the misconduct of photographers).
45 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the right to
privacy extends to the use of contraceptives within a marriage).
46 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right of a woman
to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy is a right of privacy protected by the
United States Constitution).
47 See Cruzan v. Mvissouri Dept. of Health, 457 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing
as a right to privacy an individual's wish that life sustaining treatment be withdrawn).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating
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other, non-enumerated rights such as the right to privacy. 49 These
implied rights are considered fundamental liberties and have
historically fallen within a judicially created "zone of privacy." 50 In
Griswold v. Connecticut,5' the court stated that there is a right to
privacy which lies within the penumbras of the First,52 Fourth,53 and
Ninth 54 Amendments. Griswold involved a Connecticut statute
criminalizing the use of birth control. Planned Parenthood and an
attending physician were charged as accessories for providing patients
with information and medical advice about contraception. 55  The
Court invalidated the statute and held that it violated a "peripheral"
right of privacy which, while not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, is derived from the specific rights enumerated in
particular amendments. 56  For instance, the right to association
protected by the First Amendment, and the right to be secure in one's
home and person protected by the Fourth Amendment, were described
by the Court as "penumbras" which encompassed other liberties, such
as the right to privacy.57 Justice Douglas concluded that the statute
was overbroad and reasoned that its enforcement would require the
police to monitor the use of contraceptives. This in turn, would
obligate the authorities to enter private homes and private bedrooms,
thus violating individual rights of privacy. 58  Justice Goldberg's
concurrence suggests that the Ninth Amendment provides additional
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."); U.S. CONST. amend. IX
(stating that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
49 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (explaining that the facts of the present case
lie within the zone of privacy created by several constitutional guarantees).
5 Id.
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52 U.S. CONST. amend I.
53 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
54 U.S. CONST. amend IX.
51 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
'See id. at 483.
57 See id. at 485 (stating that what emanates from specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights form penumbras which protect other rights).
58 Id. (questioning the legitimacy of allowing the police to search the sacred
precincts of the marital bedroom for telltale signs of contraceptive use).
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fundamental rights and lends strong support to the view that the
protection of "liberty" is not restricted to the rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight, amendments, but rather that marital
privacy which reflects traditional values, is fundamental and thus
protected under the Constitution. 5 9 In essence, Griswold held that the
Constitution may be read to protect a right to privacy which extends to
the use of contraceptives within a marital relationship. In Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 60 the Court extended the right to privacy with regard to the
use of contraception to non-married individuals.
The following year, the holding of Griswold was reaffirmed in
the landmark case of Roe v. Wade.61 In Roe the Court held that the
"zone of privacy," embodied in particular amendments and in the
concept of "liberty", renders the right of a woman to terminate her
pregnancy as fundamental.62 The Court resolved the tension between
a woman's right to privacy on one hand, and the state's right to
protect the unborn on the other by finding that the two interests are
separate and distinct, growing more distinct as the pregnant woman
approaches full term. 
63
The right to privacy also extends to a person's significant
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, but in some
cases the state's interest in regulating the withdrawal of life support
may be held to warrant a higher level of constitutional protection than
an individual's right to refuse this very treatment. 64  Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health exemplifies this dilemma.65 In that
9 See id. at 487 (stating that the Ninth Amendment provides support for the
right of marital privacy).
6o 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
6" Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (holding that a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy is fundamental and therefore within her right to privacy).
62 See id. at 155 (indicating that the regulation of a fundamental right requires
that the law in question be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest).
63 See id. at 164 (setting forth a trimester framework which permitted the
state to regulate abortion in order to protect the fetus after six months, because at or
around the sixth month of pregnancy, the fetus acquires the capability to live outside of
the woman's womb at which point its potential life becomes viable and thus outweighs
the woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy).
64 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
65 Id.
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case, the patient was in an accident that resulted in her being in a
persistent vegetative state.66 Her parents wanted the artificial feeding
terminated but the hospital refused.67 The Court upheld a statute that
required clear and convincing evidence of the patient's desire that
life-sustaining treatment be withdrawn. 68  Notwithstanding the rigid
burden of proof, the Court recognized, as a right to privacy, a patient's
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, but held that in this
case the State's interest in protecting human life and in its interest in
safeguarding the personal choice of life and death justifies this
stringent evidentiary standard.69
This historical preamble suggests a spectrum of rights that
have been recognized as comprising the right to privacy. This note,
however, will attempt to decipher the value of privacy in its relation to
freedom. This "relationship" has been described as "a three-way deal
between state power, popular instinct, and the media's muscle., 70
I. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
How free the press truly is often reflects the preferences and
values of a particular nation.7' In Britain, the laws governing the
press allow for great leniency with respect to news gathering
techniques and consequently little respect for an individual's right to
privacy. 7
2
Today's true Brit is perhaps Cyril Reenan, whose
hobby was snooping on other people's conversations
with the assistance of a fifteen hundred dollar radio
scanner . . . .When he intercepted Princess Diana's
conversation with an old boyfriend he insisted that he
6See id. at 266.
67 See id. at 267.
6See id. at 286.
69 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
70 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39 (suggesting that the increase or decrease
of the right to privacy depends on the right to freedom of press and vice versa).
71 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39.
72 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39.
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did not want to hurt the Royal family . . . that,
evidently, is why he delivered the tapes to the Sun for
safekeeping. 
7 3
It is no wonder that Princess Diana attempted in vain, in life and in
death, to shed light on an absolute need: the right to privacy.74 On the
other hand, the right to freely express one's self is an equally
significant, equally coveted liberty. The values embodied in both
rights are by their very nature in constant competition. 5 Therefore, an
individual must often relinquish a certain degree of his privacy in
order to enjoy the right to live in a society in which information and
opinion flow freely. 76
In the United States, freedom of expression is protected by the
First Amendment of the Constitution. It states in pertinent part that:
"Congress shall make no law,.., abridging the freedom of speech; or
of the press .. . .,7 The First Amendment was adopted in 1791,
during a time when freedom of the press was a matter of widespread
concern. 78  The press clause was a product of the American
Revolution and its importance was grounded in the need to formulate
a new government in which independence, self-governance, and the
unobstructed dissemination of information were essential. 79 In
addition, historical evidence indicates that, at least initially, the
Framers sought to protect freedom of the press in an unqualified
manner.80 A number of later state constitutions did however include a
limitation on press freedom described by Blackstone as the authority
73 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39.
74 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39.
75 See Arrington v. New York Times Company, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y.
1982) (discussing the tension between the right to free speech and the right to privacy).
76 See id. at 1319 (suggesting that an inability to vindicate a privacy right
violation is a price one must be prepared to pay in exchange for the right to free speech
and press). 77 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78 David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv.
455, 487 (1983) (stating that every version of the Bill of Rights contained a press clause).
79Id. at 488.
80 Id. (stating that no one suggested that it was necessary to balance the
freedom of the press against other interests).
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of the government to "censure criminal matter after publication.
Blackstone's early sentiment indicating that freedom of the press
consisted of laying no previous restrictions upon publications has
been "generally[,] if not universally, considered to be the chief
purpose of the press clause guaranty., 82 When the First Amendment
was enacted, the need to permit the press to publish freely was seen as
a valuable way to combat and or prevent governmental oppression and
tyranny.83 The general proposition that the First Amendment secures
the right of every individual to freely express opinion- with respect to
public issues is well settled. 84 The Court stated in Bridges v.
California,85 that "It is a prized American privilege to speak one's
mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions. 8
6
Whether a publication which contains falsities retains this
constitutional protection, however, is a question that was considered
in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan.87 In that case, the
Court concluded for the first time that First Amendment protections of
speech and press place at least some limitations on a state's ability to
prosecute defamation cases.88  The plaintiff, a supervisor in the
Montgomery, Alabama Police Department, sued the New York Times
alleging that he had been libeled by statements in a New York Times
advertisement. The advertisement stated that the Montgomery Police
81 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931); see also Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,462 (1907).
82 Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
83 See Anderson, supra note 78, at 491-92 (stating that in the eighteenth
century freedom of speech was viewed as a "sacred privilege" integral to a free
government).
8 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (stating that the
interchange of ideas brings about social and political change); see also Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (holding that the opportunity for free political
discussion is a fundamental principle of our Constitution).
85 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
'6Id. at 270.
87 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the First
Amendment protections of free speech and press do place some limits on a state's power
to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their
conduct and that a rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable).
" Id. at 271.
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department had attempted to terrorize Martin Luther King.89
Although the advertisement did not mention the plaintiff by name, he
feared that due to his status at the police department his reputation
would nonetheless be injured.9° At the time, Alabama's libel law
provided for strict liability. 9' A publisher could not defend himself by
claiming that he reasonably believed his statements to be true if in fact
they were false.92 In addition, although truth was a valid defense, it
was one to which the defendant bore the burden of proof 9' Since
there were a few minor factual errors in the advertisement, all relating
to the exact number of times that Dr. King had been arrested, the New
York Times was held liable for damages amounting to a half million
dollars.
94
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that in order
for a public official to recover damages for a defamatory falsehood, he
or she must prove that the statement was made with "actual malice" -
- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.95 The Court viewed this case as one
involving criticism of government policy since the Alabama libel laws
enabled the white political majority to punish factions who supported
different civic ideals, namely proponents of civil rights.
96
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that "public debate should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.",
97
g9Id. at 256.
90Id. at 258.
91 Id. at 267. But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
9 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271.
93 id.
94 Id. at 263.
93 Id. at 279; see also, e.g., Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78
(1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1964).
"6Id. at 273.
17 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272 (considering this case against the
principle that debating public issues should be unbridled, vigorous and wide-open, even
though at times such debate may include acrimonious attacks upon the government and
public officials).
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The "actual malice" standard set forth in New York Times was
extended to include public figures in 1967.98 The Court has
recognized three categories of public figures: those who are famous
generally, those who voluntarily inject themselves into a public
controversy, and those who involuntarily become public figures
because they are affected by the actions of public officials. 99
Although the parameters of this last category are not easily
discernible, it is not difficult to imagine that the wife of a United
States president would fall within such a classification, however
narrowly defined.
One year before the Court defined the various public figure
categories, former First Lady Jacqueline Onassis, attempted to
vindicate a violation of her privacy by bringing suit against an
intrusive photographer. 100 The Second Circuit granted Onassis a
permanent injunction forbidding Mr. Galella, the photographer, from
coming within twenty-five feet of her or her children. 0 1 Some
examples of Galella's conduct against which this restraint ran
included the following: using flashbulbs inches from Onassis' face;
invading her children's private schools; bribing apartment house,
restaurant, and nightclub doormen; and jumping and gesturing in an
98 Compare Curtis Pub. v. Butts & Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130
(1967) (holding that both a University of Georgia football coach and a prominent retired
army general were public figures), with Hutchinson v. Proimire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)
(holding that a behavioral scientist who accepted federal funds and responded to a
Senator's remarks did not place himself in a public controversy in order to be considered
a public figure under the New York Times standard).
99 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323 (articulating three classifications of public figures:
1) those who have general fame, 2) those who have voluntarily injected themselves into a
public controversy, and are public figures only with respect to that controversy, and 3)
involuntary public figures, specifically those which are directly affected by the actions of
public figures, such as the defendant in a criminal case); see also Time Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976) (maintaining a public figure must be one who occupies a role of
prominence in society or places themselves in a particular controversy in hopes of
influencing the outcome).
"
0o See Galella, 487 F.2d at 991 (litigating the acts of a photographer/plaintiff
who engaged in numerous antics in order to obtain photographs of the defendant and her
family to be in violation of privacy).
'o' See id. at 992 (describing a section of the Court's judgment that prohibited
certain future conduct by the plaintiff).
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attempt to photograph the family. 1 02 On one occasion Galella went as
far as slapping Mrs. Onassis in the face with a camera strap just to get
a reaction.'0 3 The Court found that Galella had "insinuated himself
into the very fabric of Mrs. Onassis' life . . ." and framed its relief
partially on the need to prevent the invasion of privacy, but held that
the injunction was sustainable due primarily to New York's
proscription of harassment. 10 4  The Court stated that although
substantive support existed for recognizing the right to privacy as a
distinct, fundamental liberty, the protection of this right was left
largely to the law of the individual states. 105 Thus, the court protected
the right to privacy through the imposition of a criminal sanction. 
06
In his defense, Galella invoked the First Amendment in an attempt to
immunize his "news gathering conduct" from any liability. 10
7
However, the court found that Galella's actions went "far beyond the
reasonable bounds of news gathering, and that there was no threat to
the free press in requiring its agents to act within the law."'' 0 8 Hence,
the court concluded that his intrusive presence constituted a crime not
102 See id. at 991 (describing the antics used by the plaintiff in order to obtain
photographs of the defendant and her family).
103 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 39 (stating that Galella had intentionally
assaulted Onassis).
104 See Galella, 482 F.2d at 994 (defining harassment as the intentional
following of a person, the infliction of physical contact or the engaging in any annoying
conduct without any legitimate cause, and finding that Galella's conduct fell within this
violation); see generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1997) ("[A] person is
guilty of harassment when he or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses another person
by following such a person in or about a public place or places by engaging in a course of
conduct by repeatedly committing acts which places such a person in a reasonable fear of
physical injury.").
'o' See Galella, 482 F.2d at 994 (stating that the United States Constitution
affords protections for specific manifestations of privacy, while the protection of a
person's general right to privacy should be left to the individual states).
106 See id. at 998 (granting injunctive relief prohibited the plaintiff from
coming within thirty feet of the defendant, any physical contact by the plaintiff to the
body of the defendant, any prevention of defendant's movement in public, any acts which
may tend to place the life and safety of the defendant in danger, and any conduct which
may be seen to harass of frighten).
o"Id. at 995.
log Id.
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within the scope of First Amendment protections. 109 The result of this
renowned case has been characterized as an "exceptional compromise
between free speech and privacy."'1 °  Galella was ordered to stay
twenty-five feet from Onassis and her children, but his freedom to
take and publish the photographs was not restrained.11'
As opposed to individuals who become "involuntary public
figures" as a result of their relationships with those in governmental
offices, others find themselves in the public spotlight through less
fortunate means. In Howell v. New York Post,112 a photographer
illegally entered a private psychiatric institute and used a telescopic
lens to photograph Pamela Howell while she was standing next to a
fellow patient, Hedda Nussbuam.1 3 At the time, Hedda Nussbuam's
name frequently appeared in newspaper headlines. She had been the
victim of continuous, violent beatings at the hands of her husband,
who was the subject of a much publicized ongoing murder trial
involving the death of their illegally adopted daughter." 4  Pamela
Howell, however, was uninvolved and wished her hospitalization to
remain a secret to all but her immediate family. She implored the
Post's editor not to publish the photograph.' Unfortunately, her
pleadings went unheeded and the photograph was published on the
front page. 116  Howell sued, claiming intentional infliction of
emotional distress and invasion of privacy. 17 The New York Court of
Appeals dismissed her complaint and, in adhering to its holding in
Roberson, declared that a right to privacy against intrusion was still
109 Id.
110 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39 (explaining that Galella was forced to
remain twenty-five feet from Onassis and he was prohibited from doing anything that
might cause her fright but that his right to take and sell photographs of her was not
restrained, reconfirming the long-held principle that prior restraints on publications are
not constitutional).
111 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39.
812  N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993).
Id. at 700.
114 id.
115 See Martin London, Greater Legal Restrictions on the Paparazzi? Yes,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at 2 (describing Howell's ordeal).
116 id.
117 id.
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not a part of New York's common law.1 8 The result is that the rights
of the paparazzi in New York are respected more than in other
states. 119
In the much acclaimed case of Hustler v. Falwell,121 the
Supreme Court held that a libel claim brought by a public figure could
not be sustained unless the words or depiction at issue could be
"reasonably understood as describing actual facts or events."' 121 In so
holding, it reaffirmed the ground rules laid down in New York Times
v. Sullivan. 122 Moreover, it established that First Amendment
protections do in fact encompass the right to publish even the most
distasteful of political and social satires. 123 In Hustler, Jerry Falwell,
a nationally known minister and commentator on politics and public
affairs, sued Hustler magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, for
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
libel.124  These claims stemmed from the publication of an
advertisement which portrayed Falwell as having engaged "in a
drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse."''
25
The District Court dismissed the invasion of privacy claim but found
against Hustler on the libel and emotional distress claims. 126 The
court rejected the New York Times "actual malice" standard, 127
thereby making it unnecessary for Falwell to prove that Hustler had
1" See Howell, 612 NE.2d at 703 (citing Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 171 N.Y. 538).
119 See London, supra note 115, at 2 (stating that the court refused to adopt a
privacy intrusion tort).
120 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
121 Id. at 57 (finding that the Hustler ad parody "was not reasonably
believable").
122 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 258 (holding that the First Amendment
protections of free speech and press do place some limits on a state's power to award
damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their conduct and
that a rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable).
123 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55.
Id. at 49.
I25 d. at 48.
126 id.
127 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (defining the "actual malice"
standard as a statement made either with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not).
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published the advertisement knowing that it was false. 128  The
Supreme Court, however, reversed and concluded that in order for a
public figure to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress
by reason of publications such as the one at issue here, he or she must
show that the publication contained a false statement of fact which
was made with "actual malice." 129 Although Falwell contended that
the caricature in question here was so "outrageous" as to be
distinguished from traditional, political satire cartoons, the Court
rejected this distinction and deemed the depiction as falling within
First Amendment protections.130  The Court reasoned that an
"outrageousness" standard would not be reconcilable with its
traditional refusal to allow damages to be awarded merely because the
speech in question may have a negative emotional impact on the
audience.13 1 Justice Rehnquist writing for a unanimous Court stated,
"the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient
reason for suppressing it . . . . Speech does not lose its protected
character ... simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them
into action."' 132
The Court's holding in Hustler confirms that the Constitution
recognizes the importance of the press. 33 The vital significance of
the press' access to information, especially in judicial and political
settings, is necessary to maintain a free and democratic society.
134
128 Id. (allowing plaintiffs to avoid proving that the declarant made statements
with the requisite knowledge that they were false, when the "actual malice standard is not
applied"); see also Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46 (removing the "actual malice" standard as
defined in New York Times from this case).
129 See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 54 (holding that even though the "actual malice"
standard as applied in New York Times was inapplicable because a public figure still
needs to prove that a false statement was made with actual malice).
130 See id. at 55 (rejecting an "outrageous" standard as proposed by the
plaintiff for such political satirical cartoons).
131 See id. (stating the attitudes of the public towards certain speech are
irrelevant).
132 See id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726).
133 See id. (indicating that First Amendment speech and press protections
encompass even the most offensive forms of speech).
134 See Ann Sjoerdsma, Journalism: Don't Shoot Messenger; Study Message,
Tim VIRGMA-PILOT, Sept. 2, 1997, at E4. (stating that the importance of the press as a
truth teller is recognized by the constitution).
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Although the First Amendment protects a journalist's right to acquire
and disseminate information, it does not grant a completely exempt
status.' 3 5 Members of the press can be held liable for civil wrongs and
they can also be charged with crimes. 13 6 Laws exist for the purpose of
regulating, and if necessary, disciplining press members for unlawful
or improper conduct. 37 In addition, some members of society, due to
their fame or notoriety, are protected from overly intrusive members
of the press on the basis of another legal doctrine which stems from
the right to privacy and is generally known as the right to publicity."13
1H. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Public figures are often viewed as having consented to media
persecution and thus, to some extent, having forfeited their privacy
rights.' 3 9  It is unclear to what degree, however, a celebrity's
volitional courting of the public diminishes his or her right to
privacy.140  The position of the press stems from a notion that the
public has a right to know. 14  The question then becomes what
exactly falls within this much coveted and regularly demanded public
135 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (finding that the
First Amendment does not prohibit the state from restricting publication of child
pornography); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977)
(holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit an entertainer from recovering
damages for a right of publicity violation stemming from the press' broadcasting of the
entertainer's act without permission to do so); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-
85 (1957) (prohibiting the publication of obscene materials).
136 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652 B (1977) (incorporating causes
of action for torts such as invasion of privacy, libel and emotional distress); AL MODEL
PENAL CODE § 221.2 (protecting against criminal trespass).
137 Id.
138 See Prosser, supra note 31, at 383 (discussing how Prosser's fourth
category of privacy intrusions which protects against the unauthorized use of a person's
name or image by someone else for profit or commercial advantage came to be called the
right to publicity).
139 See Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4 (questioning a public figures right to
restrain the institution of the press).
'4o See Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4.
141 See Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4.
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right?142 Should the intimate details of a public figure's private life
become common knowledge on demand? 143 An Italian photographer
who captured Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed kissing on a beach in
France would certainly argue so.144 The public apparently agrees, for
the photographer became a millionaire overnight. 145  What is of
interest to the public has long been the determining factor in
discerning what is or is not newsworthy material. 146 Thus, the Court's
metaphor of a marketplace of ideas 147 takes on an entirely literal
cast.148  Consequently, the balance between "the public's right to
know" and an individual's right to privacy is an uncertain one. 149
Nevertheless, the right of a public figure to protect his or her image
against commercial misappropriation exists and has been afforded
legal protection in a vast majority of jurisdictions. 150
This right is known today as the right of publicity.'51
Essentially, the right of publicity is "the right to own, protect, and
profit from the commercial value of one's name, likeness, activities,
or identity, and to prevent the unauthorized exploitation of these traits
by others."' 152 This legal doctrine has not yet been fully developed or
142 See Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4.
143 See Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4.
14 See Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4 (describing a photographer's
mission to capture an image of Princess Diana's intimate life).
145 See Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4.
14 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39 (implying that what the public is
interested in is usually what makes headlines).
147 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J.,
dissenting). 148 See NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
149 See Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4 (discussing the balance between the
free press and the right to privacy).
15o See, e.g., Republic Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, 213 F.2d 662, 665-66 (9th
Cir. 1954) (holding that reproductions of the "name, voice, and likeness" of a performer
have value due to the performer's notoriety and public following); Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The right to publicity
has developed to protect the commercial interest of celebrities in their identities.").
151 Kenneth E. Spahn, The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy, Property,
or Public Domain?, 19 NOVA L. REv. 1013, 1014 (1995).
152 id.
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uniformly applied.153 There is no specific right of publicity statute on
the federal level, but several states have enacted legislation that serves
to protect celebrity publicity rights.' 4 For instance, according to the
Supreme Court of California, "item 4 of Dean Prosser's classification
of invasion of privacy has been complemented legislatively by Civil
Code § 3344 .... ,155 The statute reads: "Any person who knowingly
uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any
manner,... for the purposes of advertising or selling ... without such
person's prior consent ... shall be liable. . ..in an amount equal to...
the actual damages suffered for any damages as a result of the
unauthorized use .... 156 The majority of states, however, must refer
to common law rights of privacy principles when confronted with
right of publicity claims. 157
The lack of uniform legal standards often results in an
inconsistent application of right of publicity law.'5 ' Another factor
which exacerbates the lack of predictability with which the right to
publicity law is applied is that it has been construed to fall within a
number of various legal categories ranging from copyright and
property law to differing rights of privacy.' 59
Although many legal scholars agree that the right of publicity
originated from the right to privacy, as articulated by Warren and
Brandeis, it is sometimes problematic to analyze right of publicity
violations under existing privacy rights law. 160 Distinctions between
the rationales used to support these legal concepts become apparent
153 See Gary M. Ropski, Celebrity Status and Right of Publicity, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 31, 1997 at 5 (discussing the differing bodies of law from which the right to publicity
is believed to have derived from).
154 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08
(West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-105 (West 1995).
155 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979).
15 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
157 See Spahn, supra note 151, at 1015 (stating that many courts look to
common law to decide rights of publicity cases).
1m See Spahn, supra note 151, at 1015.
159 See Spahn, supra note 151, at 1015 (stating that "protecting a person's
likeness does not fit neatly into one legal category").
160 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 916 (1989) (analyzing the right of publicity
as interpreted on the basis of right of privacy legal concepts).
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when one compares the two. 161 The rationale behind the right to
privacy usually focuses on the idea that an intrusion into someone's
privacy may cause mental and emotional distress, as well as injury to
a person's dignity.' 62 This argument may not be as persuasive when
asserted by celebrities "who thrive on public exposure and
publicity."' 163 Because their images have been spread throughout the
media with their consent. 164 It has been argued that what celebrities
are truly concerned with is not that their names or images have been
publicized, but that they have been publicized without monetary
compensation. 165 Furthermore, members of the press who have been
accused of invading the privacy of celebrities often invoke a waiver
defense, arguing that the celebrity in question has waived his right to
privacy by willingly entering the public arena. 166  Since right to
privacy arguments are sometimes inappropriately invoked and are
often inadequate to rectify celebrity injuries, it has become difficult
for celebrities to successfully prosecute rights of publicity violations
based on privacy rights law. 1
67
A second theory has been suggested which asserts that the
right of publicity is essentially a property right.168  The reasoning
underlying this theory is based on the idea that a person who has
invested time and effort in developing a marketable persona should
have the exclusive right to realize monetary profits from his or her
created "product."' 169 A number of courts have interpreted the right to
publicity to constitute a property right. 170  The court's decision in
161 Id.
162 id.
163 See Spahn, supra note 151, at 1025.
164 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 916-17.
165 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 916-17.
16 See Spaim, supra note 151, at 1025 (discussing an obstacle celebrities face
when attempting to assert their right to publicity).
167 See Spahn, supra note 151, at 1025.
168 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 917 (discussing the theory that persons who
have labored to create a commercial value in their own image now own their image and or
publicity as though it were a tangible piece of property).
169 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 917.
170 Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428; Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum
Inc., 202 F. 2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Halean Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 171 was based on a property
theory and represented a landmark precedent in identifying a
proprietary right to publicity distinct from the right to privacy: 172 "In
addition to and independent of the right of privacy ... a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photographs .. .here, as often
elsewhere, the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts
enforce a claim which has pecuniary value. This right might be called
a 'right of publicity.""
173
A third method of interpreting the right of publicity involves
an analysis under copyright law.174  Many scholars have supported
this theory due to the similarity in the rights both legal doctrines
protect. 175 For instance, copyrights protect the rights of artists to reap
the monetary benefits of their creations. 176  Likewise, the right of
publicity permits celebrities to retain these same benefits with respect
to creations which consist of their own images.177  The use of
copyright law as a basis for interpreting the right of publicity,
however, has met with some opposition, and certain distinctions have
been set forth.17 1 While copyright infringement involves a showing
that there will be a likelihood of confusion regarding the original
source, the unauthorized use of a celebrity's identity for advertisement
purposes involves false endorsement. 179 In addition, since copyright
law protects creative expression only if it is "fixed in a tangible
medium," it may become unworkable when applied to right of
publicity situations.180  For instance, how would a court distinguish
171 202 F.2d 866.
172 Id.
'73 Id. at 868.
174 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 919 (comparing the inherent right of an
artist to the revenue from his 'works of art' and the right of a public figure to the revenue
his 'image' or 'persona' produces).
175 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 919.
176 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 919.
177 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 919 (comparing the inherent right of an
artist to the revenue from his 'works of art' and the right of a public figure to the revenue
his 'image' or 'persona' produces).
178 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 919.
179 See Blanck, supra note 33, at 919.
180 See Spahn, supra note 151, at 1031 (noting Bela Lugosi's portrayal of
Dracula and the difficulty involved in deciphering whether Lugosi had a propriety claim
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between an actor's personal attributes in his portrayal of a character,
which he would have a possessory and ownership interest in, and the
character itself, in which he would have no possessory interest in?' 8'
Notwithstanding the obstacles that the legal doctrine of the
right of publicity has faced, namely the lack of uniform standards by
which to interpret these rights, trends in state law indicate a
broadening of protection for celebrities. 182 In California, a series of
circuit court cases exemplify this broad right of publicity and portray
the right as extending to anything evoking someone's identity,
including one's name, likeness, unique style or characteristics. 183 In
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,184 the defendant used
a picture of a well-known professional racecar driver in its
advertisements. 85 Although the picture was slightly altered by the
defendant, the distinctive characteristics of both the plaintiff and his
racecar remained. 186 Even though the plaintiffs name or likeness
were not appropriated, the court held that the right of publicity claim
should be submitted to the jury and stated that "the car under
consideration clearly has a driver and displays several uniquely
distinguishing features" leading people to think that "the car in
question was the plaintiff's and infer that the person driving the car
was the plaintiff. 18
7
The California court continued to expand the common law
right of publicity in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,188 where it held that
Midler had stated a right of publicity claim even though her actual
to Dracula's revenue since the character was created by someone other than Lugosi but
Lugosi himself played Dracula, hence contributing his own personal features and
attributes).
181 See Spahn, supra note 151, at 1031.
182 CAL. Civ. CODE § 990 (1998); FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1998); VA. CODE §
8.01-40 (1992).
'
83 See Todd J. Rahimi, The Power to Control Identity: Limiting a Celebrity's
Right to Publicity, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 725, 728 (1995) (discussing the expansion of
the right of publicity).
"4 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
185 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 822.
186 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 822.
187 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 827.
'8' 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1974).
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name and likeness had not been used. 189 In that case, actress/singer
Bette Midler declined to sing in the commercial at issue. When the
defendant employed a sound-alike to sing one of her famous songs,
Midler successfully sued for violation of her rights to publicity.
90
The court reasoned that by using a sound-alike, the defendants
"convey[ed] the impression that Midler was singing for them," and
therefore, "for their own profit in selling their product did appropriate
part of her identity." 191
In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,' 92 the Sixth
Circuit held that a plaintiff could recover without proof of the
defendant's misappropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness. ' 93 In
Carson, the defendant used Johnny Carson's twenty-five year old
introductory slogan "Here's Johnny" to promote its portable toilets. 94
The Court declared that the "phrase is generally associated with
Carson by a substantial segment of the television viewing public" and
held that "Carson's identity may be exploited even if his name ... or
his picture is not used."' 9
5
Finally, in White v. Samsung Elec. America, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit substantially extended the right of publicity law to include a
plaintiff's "identity" as well as his or her name or likeness. 196 In that
case, Samsung ran a series of commercials to promote its electronic
products by taking items from today's culture and placing them in the
twenty-first century.197 The advertisement at issue depicted a robot
standing next to a game board with lighted letter blocks wearing a
wig, jewelry, and gown purposely chosen to resemble Vanna White, a
host on the game show Wheel of Fortune.198  Vanna White's
..9 Id. at 463.
'9' Id. at 461.
'9' Id. at 463-64.
192 698 F.2d 831(6th Cir. 1983).
193 id.
194 id.
195 Id.
196 White v. Samsung Elec. America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992),
reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
197 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 734 (discussing Samsung's use of Vanna
White's image in an attempt to sell electronic products).
198 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 734.
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permission was not sought and she was not compensated for the use of
her image. 199 White successfully brought a right of publicity action
against Samsung.200 The Court held that a common law right of
publicity applied, and that the right of publicity does not require that
appropriations of identity be accomplished through particular means
to be actionable.20 1 Accordingly, the court stated "it is not important
how the defendant appropriated the plaintiff s identity, but whether or
not he has done so."202
In the early 1980s, courts20 3 broadened their interpretation of
the misappropriation tort as well.20 4  The content of the
misappropriation theory had previously included only advertising
material.20 5 Yet, when Cher brought suit against Forum, a sexually
oriented magazine, the Ninth Circuit extended the traditional
protections provided under the rights of publicity legal theories to
206include, among other things, articles, interviews, and commentaries.
Cher, the television and film actress and singer, was one of the first
celebrities to assert this newly broadened right.20 7 She sued the
publishers of Forum and claimed that her right of publicity had been
violated.20 8  The dispute involved an interview by Cher with a
freelance writer who covertly sold the proposed article to Forum,
instead of the magazine he had assured her that he was writing for. 209
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment did not protect
Forum 's comments in its advertisement from a misappropriation suit,
because of their falsity and commercial content, but that the First
199 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 734.
200 Samsung, 971 F.2d at 1395.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Cher v. Forum Ltd., 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
204 See Smith, supra note 9, at 11 (discussing how the right of publicity now
encompasses protection against the misappropriation of interviews and commentaries).
205 See Smith, supra note 9, at 11.
201 See Cher, 692 F.2d at 635.
207 See Smith, supra note 9, at 11 (stating that Cher was one of the first public
figures to assert the right against the misappropriation of an interview she granted a
journalists). 28 See Cher, 692 F.2d at 636.
209 id.
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Amendment did protect the publication of the interview itself 210
Although injunctive relief is the traditional remedy for a right of
publicity violation, the Cher court went so far as to award general
damages, special damages, and exemplary damages totaling around
$650,000.212
Despite the obvious difficulty in valuing a celebrity's fame,
not to mention the opaqueness involved in valuing a celebrity's right
to that fame, there seems to be a growing tendency to award damages
for infringement of rights of publicity.21 3 In a case involving a dispute
which arose out of a movie titled Beatlemania, the California Superior
Court calculated an $8 million award for the "massive appropriation"
of the Beatles' right of publicity.214 The plaintiffs in that case claimed
right of publicity violations and unfair competition on the ground that
''people were likely to believe that the Beatles had consented to or
authorized Beatlemania.21 5  The court stated that the actors in
Beatlemania so accurately simulated the Beatles that "viewers fell
prey to the illusion that they were actually viewing the Beatles in
performance., 216 The court's reasoning is difficult to understand in
light of the fact that most people know John Lennon is dead and that
the Beatles stopped performing as a group in 1970.217 Given the
court's assessment of the situation, it seems unlikely that an
"extremely realistic impersonator" will have any chance of continuing
his or her career.218
It is contended that this broadened right of publicity,
extending to anything evoking someone's identity and frequently
resulting in monetary damages,219 could seriously burden creativity.
21 Id. at 635.
211 See Ropski, supra note 153, at 7 (stating that although it is difficult to
place a monetary value on a celebrity's right to publicity some courts have awarded
damages for the violation of this right).
212 See Ropski, supra note 153, at 7.
213 See Ropski, supra note 153, at 7.
214 Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 12 MEDIAL. REP. 2280 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986).
215 See Ropski, supra note 153, at 5.
216 See Ropski, supra note 153, at 5.
217 See Ropski, supra note 153, at 5.
218 See Ropski, supra note 153, at 5.
219 See Ropski, supra note 153, at 5.
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A recent law review article220 discussed the moral interests celebrities
have in their "identities" and concluded that these interests are not as
compelling as they may seem.221  According to some, the most
popular justification for the right to control one's identity is based on
a labor theory,222 under which a celebrity's product is viewed as
something created through his or her unique and independent labor. 223
His analysis, however, reveals that because fame is a "relational
phenomenon, '224 an individual's accomplishments may have more to
do with how receptive the public is to the particular individual at issue
and less to do with that individual's actual achievements. 25 The
author presents a carpenter analogy 226 to convey his theory and states
that a celebrity does not create his or her identity in the same way that
a carpenter makes a chair. 27 Although both the carpenter and the
celebrity respond to the market or the public demand, the carpenter is
alone in building the chair.2 Conversely, the celebrity's identity is
created through the public's "direct and active meaning-making
process. '229 The author also argues that the celebrities themselves,
and not the parties they sue, are being unjustly enriched.2 30  He
maintains that celebrities "borrow" liberally from their predecessors
and therefore, strictly speaking, they have not single-handedly
"invented" their identities. 31 In addition, he states that the alleged
220 See Michael T. Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image. Public
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125 (1993).
221 Id.
222 See Rahimi, supra note 182, at 731 (discussing a theory under which a
celebrity has the right to own their image due to the labor they put forth in creating it).
223 See Rahini, supra note 183, at 731.
224 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 731.
225 See Rahini, supra note 183, at 731.
226 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 732.
227 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 731 (drawing an analogy between the
finished work product of a carpenter and that of a celebrity).
228 See Rahini, supra note 183, at 732.
229 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 732.
230 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 732.
231 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 732.
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"appropriators," more often than not, exercise a substantial amount of
their own creativity.232
Members of the press play a meaningful role in creating a
person's celebrity status.233 The media is a crucial "middle-man" in
the author's "meaning-making process," 234 without which the public
at large would not be able to formulate opinions about particular
individuals. The demand for information about particular celebrities,
and their consequent commercial value, depends largely on the press
disseminating celebrity information.235 Thus, the media is a key
player in the "celebrity market., 236  Due to the media's significant
position as the conveyors of information in which the public has an
interest, 237 it can be difficult to determine where to draw the line
between the freedom the press, who should be afforded the
opportunity to do their jobs, and the respect that all persons, including
celebrities, should be granted with regard to their right to privacy. 238
IV. GREATER LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE PAPARAZZI VS. MEDIA
SELF-RESTRAINT
It is possible that in the aftermath of Princess Diana's death,
the states, the media, and the public will come together in an attempt
to produce an instrument which would allow privacy and free
232 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 733 (implying that the press and the
appropriators of public figure identities play a role in creating those identities).
233 See generally Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4 (discussing the vital
importance of the press' access to information in political or courtroom settings where
determination of the truth is integral to the process).
234 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 733.
235 See Rahimi, supra note 183, at 731 (stating that fame is a "relational
phenomenon.., a status bestowed by others").
236 See generally Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4 (suggesting that some
press institutions, particularly the tabloids view the selling of celebrity identities as
"business - simply supply and demand").
237 See generally Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4 (stating that the media's
access to information provides the public with a multitude of viewpoints which is
essential to the maintenance of a free society).
238 See generally Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4 (discussing the unstable
balance between freedom of the press and rights to privacy).
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expression to comfortably coexist.239 What exact spheres of privacy
these potential reforms seek to protect depends on varying national
values. 4 ° Still, as one author has noted, "they should generally deny
entry to the cradle, the school, the bedroom, the hospital, and the
grave., 241 In the United States, as compared with other countries,
entry into these private, sacred, realms has been the exception and not
the rule 42 Admittedly Princess Diana's death caused people around
the world to stop and question their values and their laws.243 Should
we hold ourselves accountable for buying and selling news that is
sometimes heartless and unthinking?244  Maybe. But this issue is
complicated by the symbiosis between the celebrities, who depend on
the press, who in turn depend on the public, whose desires for
celebrity images are in turn created by that very media. Moreover,
should privacy laws be expanded and legal restrictions on the
paparazzi increased?245 No, at least not in the United States. In this
country, where priority is clearly placed on a free and active press, the
solution to this dilemma must lie in the promotion and maintenance of
media self-restraint. 46
239 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39-40 (stating that "the growing number of
international public figures, whether crowned, elected, or created by happenstance, might
then enjoy the reputations they deserve: reputations that must withstand the scrutiny of all
areas of their lives except for those that are behind a door marked 'DO NOT
DISTURB."').
240 See Jonathon Alter, Diana's Real Legacy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1997, at
62 (stating that in Britain, no privacy law exists but photographers may be sued for either
harassment or trespassing; in France an individual's private domain is vast and even
presidents and monarchs can sue over photographs taken in public places without
consent; in Italy taking a photograph of an individual, even if on private grounds is
allowed; and finally in the United States photographs taken of persons in public places
who are clearly visible is permissible).
241 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39-40.
242 See generally Alter, supra note 240, at 62 (stating that in the United
States, photographers are more respectful than in Europe).
243 See generally Alter, supra note 240, at 62.
244 See generally Alter, supra note 240, at 62.
245 See generally Alter, supra note 240, at 62.
246 See Feigelson & Goodale, supra note 44, at 2 (stating that the press is
capable of any degree of reform that is ultimately deemed necessary).
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People from all walks of life have recently joined together in a
poorly conceived call for new legal restrictions on the press.247
California State Senate Majority Leader Charles Calderon "has
proposed a new California Civil Code § which creates a new category
of torts committed by paparazzi." This proposed legislation include a
"bubble-zone," requiring photographers to stay at least fifteen feet
from their subjects. 248  Another California State Senator, Tom
Hayden, proposed legislation "to crack down on the excesses of the
paparazzi and bounty-hunting journalists. ' 249 This legislation, stated
Rocky Rushing, Hayden's chief of staff, "will attempt to protect
against harassment in public places; intrusion into private areas, such
as the use of telescopic and high powered lenses to shoot into people's
homes and yachts; and will propose disincentives for selling certain
photographs. ' 250  Many American celebrities have also joined the
media reform crusade.25 ' George Clooney, a famous actor, called for
a boycott of the syndicated TV show Hard Copy for its alleged used
of "stalkerazzi" footage.252 Tom Cruise, another mega star, has called
for more strictly enforced protections against journalistic
harassment.25" Even Clooney, however, a known supporter of media
restraints, has stated that criminal laws that restrict the paparazzi
should not be passed and concluded that "[c]ensorship can never be
the solution[,]... [t]he only thing worse than an out-of-control press
acting with no regard for decency would be restricting that very same
press.
'
,
254
247 See Feigelson & Goodale, supra note 44, at 2.
248 See Ricker, supra note 5, at 29 (suggesting that even publishers should be
held liable for their work and that punitive and other damages should be made available
as remedies).
249 See David Robb & Josh Chetwynd, Diana Death Brings Flash of
Paparazzi Legislation, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Sept. 3, 1997, at 35.250 id.
251 Id.
252 See Ricker, supra note 5, at 26 (describing "stalkarazzi" as a term
celebrities have used in referring to overly intrusive members of the media).
253See Robb & Chetwynd, supra note 249, at 35 (stating that many celebrities
support the expansion of privacy laws).254 See Robb & Chetwynd, supra note 249, at 35.
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As one commentator has suggested, the greatest danger of
severe restrictions on freedom of the press lies in a "loosely-worded
law of privacy [that] may be used to shield politicians and other public
figures from legitimate press examination. '255  The Constitution
assures United States citizens that the government will not interfere
with their right to freely express themselves and that offensive speech
and/or action per se is not sufficient reason to suppress it.
2 56
Sanctions for the wrongful invasion of an individual's privacy exist in
both civil and criminal laws and are regularly enforced in an effort to
cease journalistic misconduct. 257
The proposals to reform existing privacy laws set forth by
state senators and paparazzi critics generally will have a difficult time
passing constitutional scrutiny.2 58 Senator Calderon's "bubble-zone"
plan has been criticized by prominent First Amendment attorney and
ACLU director Doug Mirell, who suggests that similar propositions
have already been declared unconstitutional. 2 9  He argues that the
Supreme Court has previously rejected a proposed "floating buffer
zone" 260 to be implemented against anti-abortion protesters for the
purpose of protecting women seeking abortions, and that such zones
created for the purpose of protecting celebrities would most likely be
found equally unconstitutional.261  In addition, he argues that
Hayden's proposed legislation would be even more likely to
encounter legal difficulties.262 Iirell concludes that, "[a]ny attempt to
255 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 8 (suggesting that corruption, politically and
otherwise, will likely remain undiscovered if the right of the press to gather and
disseminate information becomes overly restrictive).
26 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 53.
257 RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 652 B (1977) (incorporating causes
of action for torts such as invasion of privacy, libel, and emotional distress); ALI MODEL
PENAL CODE § 221.2 (protecting against criminal trespass).
258 See Ricker, supra note 5, at 29 (stating that the constitutional problems
would lie in a law that does not carefully draw the line between legitimate investigative
reporting and the paparazzi and the difficulty in doing just that).
259 See Robb & Chetwynd, supra note 249, at 35 (describing a proposal that
was invalidated by the Supreme Court last year that would have required protesters to
stay fifteen feet away from women entering abortion clinics).260 See Robb & Chetwynd, supra note 249, at 35.
261 See Robb & Chetwynd, supra note 249, at 35.
262 See Robb & Chetwynd, supra note 249, at 35.
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dictate when, how,. and under what circumstances a publisher or
broadcaster can go about doing its business is presumptively
unconstitutional because it imposes a prior restraint on speech.., the
remedy is to sue after publication". 263
The tragic death of Princess Diana will probably do little to
prevent intrusive press members from assaulting their subjects, an act
she provocatively referred to as "face rape.",264 The people who have
actively participated in the hysteria surrounding her death will
probably be the first to buy all of the special issues featuring her.265
Indeed, it is hard to escape the conclusion that most, if not all, of the
news programs and articles in the wake of her death, which featured
hand-wringing self-flagellation for their own excessive intrusiveness,
were also in the business of selling advertising time, newspapers, and
magazines. Politicians in the United States are not likely to change
existing laws.266 Change in the tabloid, however, world is possible
due primarily to the roused public who now see the paparazzi as
267unscrupulous rogues. Any photograph or article that even hints of
overly intrusive news gathering techniques will quickly cause
controversy.268 On the other hand, controversy clearly sells.
Moreover, genuine concern by the public and journalists over
"going too far" will more likely be the catalyst to permanent change in
the media world.269 On September 22, 1997, at the opening of
Clooney's movie The Peacemaker, a group of sixty photographers
stood together quietly and refused to take pictures of him because the
actor had compared paparazzi to crack dealers after Princess Diana's
death.270 A paparazzo stated, "we boycotted him to show that we
have some restraint and that we we're not a bunch of idiots running
263 See Robb & Chetwynd, supra note 249, at 35.
264 See Alter, supra note 240, at 61 (discussing Princess Diana's continuous
battle with the press to retain some degree of her privacy).
265 See Alter, supra note 240, at 61.
266 See Alter, supra note 240, at 61.
267 See Alter, supra note 240, at 61.
268 See Alter, supra note 240, at 61.
269 See Alter, supra note 240, at 62 (predicting that the tension between free
press rights and privacy rights will most likely be resolved through a growing disinterest
by the public in information that has been obtained by illegitimate means).270 Papa-mzzed, N.Y. POST, Sept. 23, 1997, at 4.
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around with cameras and causing accidents."27' Some have expressed
the hope that in the aftermath of Princess Diana's death, many
reputable journalists will reflect more seriously upon the respect of
privacy the press owes to the subjects of their work.272 "Journalists
agreed that none of them would appreciate having their own privacy
invaded with a phony charge or our children photographed without
our permission., 273 It seems possible at least that the press will be
capable of achieving some degree of change through self-reform.274
The inevitable result is that the more respectable members of
the press will make conscious attempts to guard against potential
invasions of privacy and that others will continue to see "anything on
public streets as fair game." 275  It is probably safe to say that
generally, photographers will shoot from greater distances, the public
will choose to spend its money more carefully with respect to
publications that exploit public figures, publishers will resist
economic temptations in the name of decency, and finally the courts
will regulate the media more vigilantly.276
V. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to sketch out the history and the
competitive nature of certain coveted freedoms: the right to privacy,
the right to free press, and the right to publicity. The latter, ironically,
stems from both. The irony lies in the fact that the right to publicity
stems from the right to privacy, yet while celebrities have enjoyed
enormous success in invoking their publicity rights, the ability to
enjoy the right to privacy has been far more elusive.
271 Id.
272 See Alter, supra note 240, at 62 (suggesting that Princess Diana's death
may cause overly intrusive journalists to modify their methods of gathering news).
273 See Alter, supra note 240, at 62.
274 See Feigelson & Goodale, supra note 44, at 2 (stating that in the aftermath
of Princess Diana's death, many newspapers have resisted monetary incentive to publish
photos of the accident scene).275 See Feigelson & Goodale, supra note 44, at 2.
276 See Feigelson & Goodale, supra note 44, at 2.
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Nevertheless, freedom of the press continues to hold a position
of incredible importance in American life and plays a significant role
in maintaining a free and democratic government.277 As one scholar
stated, "democracy and freedom 'move in tandem' one cannot exist
without the other. ' 278  Nonetheless, the rights of the press are not
absolute and members of the media who exceed the legal bounds of
news gathering are held responsible for their actions. The ideal laws
would set forth clearly defined boundaries beyond which the press
could not venture in the name of legitimate monetary gain or "the
people's right to know."279  Some commentators have attempted to
create these bright line boundaries, citing "the cradle, the school, the
bedroom, the hospital, and the grave' 28° as areas of life that should
remain sacred.
Due to the fact that the demand for celebrities continues to
grow, and that the privacy rights of public figures diminish each time
he or she consents to publicity, the possibility of a bright line rule of
law with regard to exact press limitations is highly unlikely.
Nevertheless, celebrities do have a right to protect their personas or
images against misappropriation by others and frequently invoke this
right successfully. 2
81
Laws that protect the right to privacy exist.282 The danger of
loosely worded press restrictions outweighs the need for the
expansion of privacy laws. Reliance on protections in existing laws
and the hope that the members of the press who practice excessive and
277 See Anderson, supra note 78, at 456 (discussing the historical background
of the freedom of the press clause and its relation to self-governance and independence).278 Lecture by Raafat S. Toss, Director of the Global Internet Liberty
Campaign for the American Civil Liberties Union (see author for notes).
279 See Sjoerdsma, supra note 134, at E4 (discussing the important truth
seeking function of the press).
280 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 39-40 (stating that the press should be
denied access to these private areas of life).
281 See, e.g., Rogers, 213 F.2d at 665-66 (holding an advertising agency liable
for misappropriating the image of a well known race car driver); Carson, 698 F.2d at 835
(holding that the unauthorized use of the twenty-five year old introductory slogan "Here's
Johnny" constituted a violation of Johnny Carson's publicity rights).
282 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 B (1977) (incorporating causes
of action for torts such as invasion of privacy, libel and emotional distress); ALI MODEL
PENAL CODE § 221.2 (protecting against criminal trespass).
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indecent methods of news gathering will modify their behavior,
together with the hope that the public itself will be deterred from
buying news that was obtained illegitimately, should suffice for the
time being to ensure that the First Amendment remains intact.
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